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INTRODUCTION 
As 1917 began, Europe was at war. By March, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia had 
abdicated his throne in favour of his son, and firing had slowed between the German 
and Russian trenches.1 At about this time, Grischa Iljitch Paprotkin,2 or German 
Prisoner No 173, No 2 Company, decides to escape.3 With 16 months of captivity 
behind him, this former Russian Sergeant of the 118th Regiment of Infantry, Knight 
of the Cross of St. George,4 begins his journey from a saw mill village prison camp in 
Navarischkij, to Vologda, in the Northeast steppes of Russia, to be reunited with his 
wife Marfa Ivanovna and child Jelisavetja.5 
Grischa never reaches Vologda. In the course of his brief escape attempt, he meets 
Babka,6 who secures for him a disguise which consists of a coat, trousers, and 
identification tag, formerly the possessions of one Ilya Pavlovitch Bjuscheff, No 5 
Company, 67th Rifles, from Vilna - now deceased.7 Babka urges Grischa to claim to be 
one of the, by now, many Russian deserters, if re-captured. 
The Case of Sergeant Grischa, first published by Arnold Zweig in 1927, is a fictional 
account of one man's doomed struggle to escape from the machinery of war.8 Grischa 
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' The Revolution of March 1917 is also known as the February Revolution. M Gilbert, First World War (Harper Collins, 
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2
 The fictional scenario which follows is taken from A Zweig, The Case of Sergeant Grischa (hereinafter "Grischa") (Eric 
Sutton, trans) (Hutchinson, 1947). 
3
 Ibid, p 18. Grischa's status is in fact that of a prisoner-of-war (hereinafter "POW") . 
4
 Ibid, p 171. 
5
 It is noted at this point in the war that the Eastern Front bulged from the Baltic coast to Upper Silesia, stretching towards 
the Duna and the Dnieper. To the south, Germany administered the area from Warsaw to Austrian territory. To the 
north, the Russians still held Riga and the land beyond the river. Ibid, p 50. 
6
 Babka, whose real name is "Anna Kyrillovna", tells him "we're Russians although we're Lithuanians". Ibid, pp 34, and 
39, respectively. 
7
 Ibid, p 44. 
8
 Grischa is based on an incident in 1917, and recounted to Zweig by a German Unteroffizier serving in Russia. K Petersen, 
Literatur und Justiz in der Weimarer Republik (1988), p 197. The novel was a bestseller both nationally and internationally. 
Zweig also wrote a play on the subject. See G Wenzel (ed), Arnold Zweig 1887-1968: Werk und Leben in Dokumenten und 
Bildern (Aufbau-Verlag, 1978), p 160. I wish to thank Prof S R Giles for translating the relevant German materials. 
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manages to reach the German garrison at Mervinsk, where, by Order of February 1917 
from Major-General Schieffenzahn, Commander-in-Chief of the Army on the Eastern 
Front (called Ob-Ost for short), 
[E]very Russian deserter who failed to report within 3 days of crossing the lines into the 
territory occupied by the German Armies to the nearest town-major, or the commander 
of the nearest military or police unit, was to be forthwith charged before a court martial, 
and within 24 hours of his sentence to be shot as a spy.9 
This Order is posted in seven languages, but Grischa cannot read. On capture, and 
as instructed by Babka, he confesses to be Bjuscheff, a Russian deserter, rather than 
Grischa, an escaped prisoner-of-war (hereinafter " P O W " ) . Grischa's, or Bjuscheff's, 
clothes and identification tag are taken for use by German spies, and he is given 
German ones: the jacket of Gunner Lewin (killed) and the trousers of a lorry driver 
who had received nine shrapnel bullets with his thigh and knee.10 In the prisoners' 
barracks where Grischa is now fed, warm and dry, "he is as neat, cheerful, and 
light-hearted as a fish heading for a weir".11 He is duly convicted by court martial as 
the "spy" BjuschefT. 
On realising his fate, Grischa reveals his true identity, and in a short time his former 
camp guards from Navarischkij A Camp are summoned to Mervinsk, where they 
identify him.12 Grischa is now known to be an escaped P O W rather than a spy/deserter 
liable to the death sentence in accordance with Orders. In Bialystok, where the Judicial 
Section of Ob-Ost Headquarters is located, the Grischa dossier is found to be in good 
order. The task now is to identify the proper court to deal with him for his escape 
attempt. However, Major-General Schieffenzahn, who considers Grischa's case to be "a 
political matter", intercedes in the legal process and orders the original sentence of the 
Divisional Court Martial to be upheld in the following terms: 
[H]igher considerations make it undesirable that such identity should be successfully 
established, inasmuch as the Commander-in-Chief [Schieffenzahn] . . . is convinced that the 
legal aspect of the case is of very slight importance compared with the military and 
political interests involved. In order to maintain the prestige of our courts and in the 
interests of military discipline, it is necessary that the proposal to revise the condemned 
prisoner's sentence should be rejected as unwarranted, and further, as prejudicial to the 
interests of the State.13 
Four months later (by now, the end of November 1917), Grischa is executed 
pursuant to the above grounds. 
Grischa raises many issues, dealing in particular with the political and military 
policies which impacted on his treatment during this part of 1917. Nevertheless, the 
many legal rules which existed at the time to guide military behaviour are not dealt 
with by Zweig in his account of Grischa's trial by court martial and subsequent 
execution. It is thus the purpose of this article to explore both the history and theory 
of the laws of war as they pertained to POWs, spies and deserters prior to and during 
World War 1, and by means of this alternative perspective, to illuminate the 
background and events described in Grischa. 
The structure of this article is as follows. First, the Hague Conventions and 
Regulations of 1899 and 1907 will be discussed with particular reference to the position 
9
 Grischa, op cil, supra n 2, p 78. See infra n 84. 
10
 Ibid, p 84. 
11
 Ibid, p 82. 
12
 Ibid, p 116. 
13
 Ibid, p 163. 
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of POWs, spies, and deserters under the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907. 
Secondly, the influence of the Geneva Conventions, and the role of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter "ICRC") during World War 1 with regard 
to POW camps will be examined. Thirdly, military practice at the time will be explored. 
Fourthly, the division of authority in enemy-occupied territory will be addressed in 
order to shed some light on the final outcome. It is concluded that while "Grischa had 
a case" in legal and humanitarian terms,14 the perspectives of wartime "necessity" 
reflected in Bjuscheff's second death were symptomatic of a deeper jurisprudential 
struggle - that between the state as creator, or as creature, of law.15 
T H E H A G U E CONVENTIONS A N D REGULATIONS 
Background 
To begin in highly general terms, modern European wars were fought for a "just 
cause" until the 16th century, and the types of harm that a "just" (or Christian) 
belligerent could employ knew few restrictions.16 By the 18th and 19th centuries, 
conflicting views as to the limits of "justness" resulted in the causes of war being 
separated ultimately from the laws of war. This disassociation led in turn to the 
development of laws of war.17 
As may be seen in the fragments of an essay on international law by Jeremy 
Bentham bearing the date 1786-1789,18 the mid-18th century experienced a new 
reliance on reason. Reason required, Bentham felt, that for any given nation, the 
general utility of doing good rather than harm to other nations should be the object 
of international law, "having the regard which is proper to its own well-being". From 
this, Bentham extrapolated international rights and duties, the breach of which must 
result in war. Though war was viewed at the time as a means of self-help and thus an 
arm of the law, Bentham's fifth object in his international code "could be, to make 
such arrangements, that the least possible evil may be produced by war, consistently 
with the attainment of the good which is sought for".19 
The community of nations which arrived at many of the basic principles of the 
modern laws of armed conflict consisted of 19th century "civilised", capitalist 
European states.20 As 19th century capitalism evolved into imperialism, the 
14
 In particular, the verdict was based on a fiction, ie, that Grischa de facto was Bjuscheff de jure. 
15
 See, eg, Grischa, op cit supra n 2, pp 78-80, 102, 129-132, 222-228, 301-305. See also infra text entitled "The Division 
of Authority in Enemy-Occupied Territory". 
16
 See, eg, S Moratiel V, "The Spanish School of the new law of nations" (September-October 1992) IRRC 416; P 
Haggenmacher, "Just War and Regular War in Sixteenth Century Spanish Doctrine", ibid, p 434; T E Holland, Lectures 
on International Law (T A Walker and W L Walker, eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 1933), pp 244 ff. 
17
 P Haggenmacher, he cit supra n 16, p 440. See also K. Ogren, "Humanitarian law in the 'Articles of War' decreed in 
1621 by King Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden" (July-August 1996) I R R C 438. 
18
 "Project of Perpetual Peace", in J Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham (1838-1843), 11 Vols, Pt 8, pp 537-554, 
excerpted in H Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America (Gould, Banks and Co, 1845 (reprinted 
1973)), pp 328-344. The "line of common utility" is emphasised. 
19
 Quoted in H Wheaton, op cit supra n 18, p 331. Traditionally, a state could release itself from all international law 
obligations except those relating to war's conduct by a declaration of war. Oppenheim's International Law Vol. II, 7,h ed, 
by H Lauterpacht (ed), (Longmans, 1952), p 179. Bentham's focus therefore would appear to be the common utility of 
mitigating the effects of war. Concurrent with the development of the principles of war law, the 19th century law of 
neutrality arose. See, eg, W Wheaton, op cit supra n 18, pp 290 ff; H Lauterpacht (ed), op cit supra this note, pp 624 
ff; F E Smith, International Law (Dent (The Temple Primers), 1900), pp 131 ff; T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, pp 395 
ff; W E Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8lh ed, by A P Higgins (ed) (OUP, 1924), pp 691 ff. 
20
 Rosas notes that "the increasing inter-dependence between these states, and the escalation of warfare, created an objective 
need for written rules common to the whole community", as determined in the last resort by the development of 
productive forces. A Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War: A Study in International Humanitarian Law Applicable 
in Armed Conflicts (Suomaleinen tiedeakatemia, 1976), pp 2, and 82, respectively. The laws of war were thus not 
considered applicable to, inter alia, the colonial wars of conquest. See, eg, Capt E Colby, "How to Fight Savage Tribes" 
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corresponding monopolisation of production and capital resulted in part in more 
sophisticated developments in arms technology.21 An early attempt to control this new 
technology of warfare was made when Tsar Alexander II invited states to attend an 
International Military Commission in St. Petersburg,22 and the St Petersburg Decla-
ration of 1868 was adopted.23 The Declaration states in pertinent part that the 
participating states had 
[B]y common agreement fixed the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to 
yield to the requirements of humanity, . . . [and] considered] that the progress of 
civilisation should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war. 
It is further stated in the Declaration that 
The only legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish during war is to 
weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; 
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate 
the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; . . . . 
As for more general attempts to codify the laws of war, the first may be said to have 
been the Lieber Code of 1863.24 Issued by the United States War Department as US 
Army General Order No 100 to regulate the behaviour of the Northern Forces during 
the American Civil War (1861-1865),25 Article 15 provides in particular that "men who 
take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be 
moral beings, responsible to one another and to God".26 
The Lieber Code in turn provided a format for subsequent projects to codify 
the laws of war, most notably, the Brussels Conference of 1874,27 the Oxford 
Manual of 1880,28 and the Hague Conventions and Annexed Regulations of 1899 and 
1907.29 In particular, both Hague Conferences expressed concern regarding evolving 
(1927) 21 AJIL 279; J E Edmonds and L Oppenheim, Land Warfare: An Exposition of the Laws and Usages of War on 
Land, for the Guidance of Officers of His Majesty's Army (hereinafter "Land Warfare") (HMSO, 1912), Paragraph 38. Cf 
J Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (Stevens, 1954), p 549 n i l . 
21
 A Rosas, op cit supra n 20, p 28. 
22
 Seventeen states, including Russia, Prussia and the North German Federation, signed the St Petersburg Declaration in 
1869. See D Schindler and J Toman (eds), The Laws of Armed Conflict (hereinafter "SchindlerlToman") (Sijthoff, 1973), 
pp 96-97. 
23
 Reprinted in A Roberts and R Guelff (eds), Documents on the Laws of War (hereinafter "RobertslGuelff") (Clarendon 
Press, 1989), at p 30. The St Petersburg Declaration prohibited the use of explosive projectiles under 400 grammes weight. 
24
 Reprinted in SchindlerlToman, with commentary, op cit supra n 22, at p 3. The Instructions for the Government of Armies 
of the United Stales in the Field, or the Lieber Code, was issued by General Order dated 24 April 1863, and promulgated 
at the request of President Lincoln. Prepared by Francis Lieber, a German by birth, the Code corresponded "to a great 
extent to the laws and customs of war existing at the time". Ibid. See, eg, E Nys, "Francis Lieber-His Life and His 
Work" (Pt 2, 1911) 5 A J I L 355; J Miles, "Francis Lieber and the Law of War" (1990) X X I X - 1 - 2 Revue de Droit 
Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 253. 
25
 See, eg, Q Wright, "The American Civil War, 1861-1865", in R Falk (ed), The International Law of Civil War (Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1971), pp 30, 54 n 37, 46 n 12; J G Randall and D Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (D C Heath, 
2d ed 1961), pp 325-339; E Chadwick, '"Rights' and International Humanitarian Law", in C Gearty and A Tomkins 
(eds), Understanding Human Rights (Mansell, 1995), pp 573, 575. 
26
 The following subjects, inter alia, are treated: rights of the captor in occupied countries, public and private property, 
protection of persons, deserters, prisoners of war, booty on the battlefield, partisans, spies, flags of truce, the exchange 
of prisoners, parole, armistice, capitulation, and insurrection. 
27
 The participating states which formulated the Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War, reprinted in SchindlerlToman, op cit supra n 22, at p 25, were European. See, eg, G Werner, "Les prisonniers 
de guerre" (1928) 21 Recueil des Cours 5, 18. The Project provided the basis for the Oxford Manual, and is not to be 
confused with the "Declaration of the Institute of International Law", in 1875, regarding the Project. G Werner, ibid, 
pp 19-20. Articles 23-34 are devoted to POWs, and articles 19-22, to spies. 
28
 The Laws of War on Land Manual Published by the Institute of International Law, provisions for POWs are provided 
primarily in articles 61-78, and regarding spies, in articles 23-26. Reprinted in SchindlerlToman, op cit supra n 22, at 
p 35. Neither the Brussels Project nor the Oxford Manual had any legal force. 
29
 The 1899 Peace Conference used the Brussels Project as the foundation for its work. The 1907 Hague Peace Conference 
"continued and completed" the work of the 1899 Conference. G . Werner, loc cit supra n 27, p 22. There were, however, 
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war technology, and the preamble of Hague Convention II of 1899 and of Hague 
Convention IV of 1907 each expressed "the desire to serve, even in this extreme case 
[of war], the interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilisation". 
Perhaps more importantly, the preamble reflected these many concerns by inclusion of 
the "de Martens Clause", the 1907 version of which reads as follows: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war can be issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it expedient to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule 
of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established between 
civilised nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public 
conscience.30 
As a final point by way of general background, the participation clause for the 
signatories to Hague Convention IV, found in article 2, provides as follows: 
The provisions contained in the Regulations [annexed thereto] as well as in the present 
Convention, do not apply except between contracting Powers, and then only if all the 
belligerents are parties to the Convention.31 
POWs 
As 1917 began, Grischa was working as a P O W at Navarischkij Camp, cutting wood 
in a saw mill village. Zweig does not give details of his original capture, only of his 
rank - that of Regimental Infantry Sergeant.32 Russian troops, despite an increase in 
the numbers of deserters from the Eastern Front, continued to engage in battle until 
Lenin's Decree of Peace of 8 November.33 As such, and pursuant to articles 4-20 of 
the 1907 Hague Regulations, Grischa, as a P O W , would be held in protective custody, 
fewer participants in 1907. Various forms of POW internment were contemplated in Hague Conventions II and III of 
1899, and Hague Conventions IV, V, X , XI , and XIII of 1907. For purposes of brevity, the following instruments are 
referred to: 1899: Convention II regarding the laws and customs of war on land, and annexed Regulations; 1907: 
Convention IV respecting the laws and customs of war on land, and annexed Regulations. Chapter 2 of the Hague 
Regulations (articles 4-20) provides for the treatment and repatriation of POWs. These provisions borrow heavily from 
the Brussels Declaration of 1874. Hague Regulations articles 29-31 deal with spies. These conventions were not regarded 
as a complete code of the applicable law, leaving additional special arrangements to the belligerents. A Rosas, op cit supra 
n 20, p 76. For example, the Anglo-German accord of 2 July 1917, the French-German accords of December 1917 (also 
dated 15 March 1918) and April 1918, the Anglo-Ottoman accord of December 1917, the French-Ottoman accord of 
March 1918, all dealt with reprisals against POWs. See G Werner, loc cit supra n 27, p 101 n 2. See also the Final Act 
of the International Peace Conference, signed at The Hague, 28 July 1899, and the Final Act of the Second International 
Peace Conference, signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907, reprinted in Schindler/Toman, op cit supra n 22, at pp 49, and 
53, respectively; F E Smith, op cit supra n 19, Appendix A n M . 
30
 Reprinted in RoberlslGuelff, op cit supra n 23, p 45. Forty-one states signed Hague Convention IV on 18 October 1907. 
31
 Emphasis added. Hague Convention IV article 2, reprinted ibid, p 46. The text of the annexed Regulations is reprinted 
ibid, pp 48-57, the provisions of which are nearly identical with the 1899 Regulations. Hague Convention IV of 1907 was 
technically without binding force during World War 1 because signatories Serbia and Montenegro had not ratified it. A l l 
the belligerents were bound to Hague Convention II of 1899 until 8 August 1917. See G Werner, loc cit supra n 27, p 
96 n 3, citing the Bulletin International des Societes de la Croix-Rouge (1918), pp 25-26. Nevertheless, the majority of the 
belligerents had issued military manuals which largely reflected the standards in the Hague Regulations as well as the 
unwritten rules of acceptable military usage. See T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, pp 290-293; infra nn 65-82, and 
accompanying text. 
32
 Grischa, op cit supra n 2, p 171. The Hague Regulations provide for the qualification of belligerent combatants in articles 
1-3; POW status flows from these requirements. Traditionally, a decision to grant POW status was evidence that (1) the 
war was international, and (2) the individual belonged to a category of persons entitled to commit hostilities. See A 
Rosas, op cit supra n 20, p 222 n 7; G Werner, toe cit supra n 27, pp 25, 39. The precise scope of protective legal 
guarantees for unprivileged combatants were, and remain, somewhat unclear. The requirement of express authorisation 
from a sovereign was apparently already abandoned by the time of the Brussels Project of 1874. See A Rosas, op cit supra 
n 20, pp 419, and 258, respectively. 
33
 Armistice negotiations were finally concluded on 15 December, and fighting ceased on the Eastern Front. The war 
resumed on 18 February 1918 when German troops crossed the ceasefire line. The Russo-German peace treaty was finally 
signed on 3 March. See M Gilbert, op cit supra n 1, pp 343-401. At this point, Grischa, had he been alive, would have 
been entitled to repatriation. See infra text accompanying n 42. 
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as "[prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the 
individuals or corps who capture them".34 He could, in paraphrase, anticipate the 
following treatment:35 
Article 4: Humane treatment, and the retention of ownership of non-military personal 
belongings.36 
Article 5: Internment in a town, fortress, camp, or other place. 
Article 6: The use of his labour (officers excepted) in work having no connection with the 
operations of war. His wages would go towards improving the conditions of his 
internment.37 
Article 7: The same basic board, lodging, and clothing as provided to the German troops. 
Article 8 merits quoting in full: 
Prisoners-of-war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the army 
of the State in whose power they are. Any act of insubordination justifies the adoption 
towards them of such measures of severity as may be considered necessary. 
Escaped prisoners who are retaken before being able to rejoin their own army or before 
leaving the territory occupied by the army which captured them are liable to disciplinary 
punishment. 
Prisoners who, after succeeding in escaping, are again taken prisoners, are not liable to any 
punishment on account of the previous flight.38 
Article 9 obliged Grischa to inform his captors of his name and rank.39 Article 1840 
afforded him a complete liberty in the exercise of religion.41 Article 19 provided that 
wills and death certificates would be received or drawn up, and burials conducted, in 
the same way as the capturing army. Article 20 provided that, after the conclusion of 
peace, repatriation would be carried out as soon as possible.42 
Spies 
Grischa, as Bjuscheff the deserter43 and presumed spy, could expect treatment guided 
by the 1907 Hague Regulations articles 29-31. Article 29 defines the word "spy",44 one 
key to which is disguise. Hence, this rule implies that a soldier, not in disguise, 
who penetrates the hostile army's zone of operations, would not normally be 
34
 Hague Regulations, article 4(1). 
35
 Additional guidance regarding the treatment of POWs is contained in the 1907 Hague Regulations article 23, entitled 
"Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges, and Bombardments". 
36
 Although Grischa carried little with him in his escape from the saw mill camp, his personal possessions were safeguarded 
by his subsequent captors, and returned to him prior to his execution. 
37
 On release, the balance for work was to be paid over, after deducting the cost of the prisoner's maintenance. 
38
 [Emphasis added.] Grischa's escape was not successful: he neither rejoined his own army, nor did he cross from the lines 
of German-occupied territory. Grischa, op cil supra n 2, pp 50-78. He should thus have been subject only to disciplinary 
punishment. Werner notes that the absence of a more severe penalty for unsuccessful escapees was in order to prevent 
assimilation with deserters ("pour eviter notamment qu'elle [la tentative d'evasion] soit assimilee a la desertion devant 
l'ennemi"). G Werner, loc cit supra n 27, p 59. 
39
 Grischa initially passed himself off as Bjuscheff the deserter. However, his unsuccessful escape attempt meant that his 
status as a POW was a continuing one. Holland notes that the failure to disclose one's true name and rank is likely to 
result only in a curtailment of advantages granted to prisoners of one's class. T E Holland, op cil supra n 16, p 841. 
40
 Articles 10-12 deal with the subject of parole, and article 13, with camp followers. Articles 14-16 concern prisoner inquiry 
offices, and relief societies. See infra nn 53-62, and accompanying text. Article 17 deals with officer rates of pay. 
41
 This was presumably facilitated by the Judeo-Christian heritage common to many of the relevant signatories to the 
Conventions. 
42
 See supra n 33. 
43
 See supra n 7. 
44
 " A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to 
obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party". 
Article 29(1). 
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considered a spy.45 And, in a manner similar to article 8(3) quoted above, is 
article 31: 
A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the 
enemy, is treated as a prisoner-of-war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts 
of espionage. 
This immunity from prosecution by capturing enemy forces after the completion of 
a successful espionage operation indicates the lawfulness of employing spies and secret 
agents. On the other hand, "custom admits their punishment by death, although a 
more lenient penalty may be inflicted".46 
T H E G E N E V A CONVENTIONS, A N D ICRC ACTIVITES 
Background 
The development of humanitarian, or Geneva, law somewhat paralleled that of the law 
of The Hague, but the two treaty bodies evolved in juridically distinct forms. Put 
simply, Hague law operates essentially to restrain the belligerents in the conduct of war 
operations, while Geneva law applies to safeguard protected persons not taking part in 
the hostilities.47 During World War 1, the 1864 Geneva Convention was in force 
between ratifying or adhering states.48 The new Hague system, on the other hand, 
applied only if all the belligerents were parties.49 The 1906 Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field 
adopted the Hague formula in article 24. States which were party to the 1864 Geneva 
Convention, but not that of 1906, applied the 1864 Convention. 
The first Geneva Conference was convened in 1863. This gave impetus to subsequent 
Geneva Conferences in 1864 and 1906.50 What is particularly apparent however is the 
absence of any express protection for POWs under Geneva law at this time.51 Henry 
45
 Article 29(2) states as follows: "[t]hus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations 
of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies". While it could be argued that 
Grischa was indeed disguised in the clothes of Bjuscheff, it was in order to further his escape as a POW. On the other 
hand, Bjuschoff the deserter/spy would not have been in disguise, but instead, in his own uniform. He would however 
have been acting clandestinely by not reporting his presence within the requisite three days. The crux of the matter was 
to prove Bjuscheff had intended to obtain enemy military information. The mental element of intent required by article 
29(1) was not made part of Schieffenzahn's Order. Cf infra n 85. 
46
 Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 158. Land Warfare was prepared by its authors for the General Staff by order 
of His Majesty's Secretary of State for War. It was embodied from 1914 onwards in the official Manual of Military Law 
(8lh ed 1951). J Stone, op cit supra n 20, p 547 n 1. See infra nn 74-82, and accompanying text. The death penalty is 
in fact what Schieffenzahn ordered in February 1917 for deserters who failed to declare their presence in Ob-Ost within 
three days, presumably on the basis that this implied spying. Supra n 9. This type of absolute prohibition takes into 
account neither the Hague requirement of a mental element, nor aspects of the surrounding circumstances, eg, the fact 
that Grischa could not read the posted warnings. 
47
 See, eg, EP Syquia, "Dr Jean Pictet and International Humanitarian Law", in Studies and Essays in Honour of Jean Pictet 
(Nijhoff, 1984), pp 551, 555. The organisation established itself as an "International Committee for Relief to Wounded 
Military Personnel" in 1863. See G Willemin and R Heacock, The International Committee of the Red Cross (Nijhoff, 
1984), p 19. 
48
 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 1864, articles 8 
and 9. 
49
 1899: Hague Convention II article 2, Convention III article 11. 1907: Hague Convention IV article 2, Convention V 
article 20, Convention X article 18, Convention XI article 9, Convention XIII article 28. One reason for this was to ensure 
reciprocity and equality of arms. See supra n 31. 
50
 The results of which were the 1864 and 1906 Conventions, reprinted in Schindler/Toman with commentary, op cit supra 
n 22, pp 203, and 223, respectively. Military criticism of the 1864 Convention, by Bismarck for example, led to a 
Conference of Societies in Paris in 1867. Ratification of the Additional Articles was refused because some related to naval 
warfare. T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, pp.332-333. A proposal in 1868 to render infractions of the Convention penal 
under national Articles of War was also rejected by the European governments. W E Hall, op cit supra n 19, pp 482-483. 
51
 Instead, reference was made to the Hague Regulations which were considered to be incomplete, as well as to custom and 
acceptable military usage. See supra text accompanying n 30. 
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Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross movement, tried to place provisions specifically 
regarding POWs on the 1864 agenda, but failed.52 In 1869, the Second International 
Conference of the Red Cross, held in Berlin, adopted a resolution regarding the 
establishment of a correspondence and information bureau.53 Dunant worked for POW 
protection in Paris, during the Franco-German War (1870-1871), after which he 
multiplied his efforts in Paris and London for a convention.54 In spring 1874, a draft 
convention on the treatment of POWs was submitted to governments for their 
consideration by the International Society for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Prisoners of War, formed in 1872 and unrelated to the Red Cross. A preparatory 
conference was cancelled however when the Brussels Conference was called by the 
Russian government.55 
Reference was made to the 1899 Hague Regulations when the Red Cross met in 
St. Petersburg, for its Seventh International Conference, and the issue was raised 
again at the Eighth International Conference in London, in 1907.56 The issue was 
effectively settled at the Ninth International Conference in Washington, in 1912. The 
Red Cross decided to take over the informational tasks authorised by article 14 of 
the Hague Regulations, as well as to entrust ICRC delegates with providing relief to 
POWs, as authorised in article 15.57 The 1906 Convention, however, brought 
voluntary assistance under the control of the belligerent employing it.58 The relevant 
bodies had already acted unofficially in this capacity during the German-Danish 
War of 1864, the Franco-German War of 1870-1871, and the Russo-Japanese 
conflict of 1904-1905, as well as during other conflicts of a more limited nature.59 A 
specific convention aimed at the protection and care of POWs was not to occur until 
! 929.60 
52
 A Rosas op cit supra n 20, p 69. Dunant subsequently delivered a report on the subject to the 1867 International 
Conference of the ICRC in Paris, in an effort to insert an additional article in the 1864 Convention to recognise the 
right of the ICRC to deal with POWs. Dunant's report was accepted by the Conference. G Werner, loc cit supra n 27, 
pp 13-14. 
53
 This would lead to the establishment of the ICRC's Prisoners of War Agency in 1914, which was charged with collecting 
and transmitting information, and visiting internment camps. See P Abplanalp, "The International Conference of the Red 
Cross as a factor for the development of international humanitarian law and the cohesion of the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement" (September-October 1995) 308 IRRC 520, 526-527. An associated innovation during 
World War 1 was the introduction of "1'avis de capture" - a simple card on which the POW wrote his prisoner status, 
address, and state of health for forwarding to his family via the free system of post provided for in article 16 of the 1907 
Hague Regulations. See G Werner, loc cit supra n 27, p 56. ICRC activities were partly founded on the conditional 
authorisation given in articles 14 and 15 of the Hague Regulations. A Rosas, op cit supra n 20, p 463. See also supra 
n 40. 
54
 G Werner, loc cit supra n 27, p 16. Dunant's efforts to involve the ICRC as an actor in conflicts were not supported by 
the Committee at this time, primarily because of its stance of political neutrality. Instead, the Committee felt that any 
presence in the field should be limited to the National Societies of the belligerents. G Willemin and R Heacock, op cit 
supra n 47, pp 23-24. 
55
 Supra n 27. The Brussels Project provisions on POWs were influenced by the International Society's draft. A Rosas, op 
cit supra n 20, p 69. However, many participants in the International Society were not invited to Brussels. G Werner, 
loc cit supra n 27, p 17. 
56
 See P Abplanalp, loc cit supra n 53, pp 527-528. 
57
 Ibid, p 528. For an overview of the distinction between the respective roles of the national societies and the ICRC, see 
G Willemin and R Heacock, op cit supra n 47. 
58
 Articles 10-13. See W E Hall, op cit supra n 19, p 482 n 3. 
59
 See P Abplanalp, loc cit supra n 53, p 528; A Rosas, op cit supra n 20, p 463. The Committee developed its 
first operational activities in 1870-1871 by creating in Basle an agency for information and relief to the sick and 
wounded in the French and Russian armies. This agency was designed to facilitate the exchange of information 
among National Societies and to be a centre for relief transmission. G Willemin and R Heacock, op cit supra n 47, 
p 24. 
60
 The 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War supplemented rather than replaced the 
provisions on POWs contained in the Hague Regulations. RoberlslGuelff, op cit supra n 23, p 215. ICRC activity for the 
development of the Hague Regulations occurred after the war. The International Law Association also adopted a Code 
for the Treatment of POWs. See ILA Report of the 30th Conference (1921), pp 236-246. 
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Grischa 
The role assumed by the national Red Cross societies and the ICRC during World 
War 1 regarding the specific issue of the humanitarian treatment of POWs became, 
among other things, a means of observing the application by the belligerents of the 
Hague Regulations. Holland notes that the very magnitude of caring for POWs 
during such a protracted war as World War 1 meant that the burdens on Germany 
in this regard - particularly during the early years - were exceedingly heavy. Reports 
made available by neutral representatives indicate that "in a number of the 
German camps conditions were extremely bad, and that almost everywhere in 
Germany prisoners suffered very great privations through shortage of food and 
clothing".61 
In Grischa's case, Zweig makes no mention of any particular hardship endured by 
the POW while in his second detention, other than personal psychological anguish 
caused by his fate. As for the informational functions of the Red Cross, there is no 
mention of any communication made to Grischa's wife of his imprisonment in 
Navarischkij saw mill camp or in Mervinsk, or of any correspondence passing between 
them. On the other hand, this could merely have been due partly to the deteriorating 
situation inside revolutionary Russia. There is however some mention of Red Cross 
delegates charged with camp inspections. In particular, delegates witness the handover 
of Grischa's possessions prior to his execution, and he is assured that "his wife will 
receive the pension of a sergeant who has fallen in action".62 
USAGE A N D CUSTOM 
Background 
As previously mentioned,63 none of the Hague Conventions dealt comprehensively 
with their subject matter, and as noted by the authors of the British Manual of 
Land Warfare, "the delicate questions of hostages and reprisals are not mentioned 
at all".64 Thus, in the discussion to follow, the impact of usage on the customary 
and written rules or laws of war, as outlined primarily in the Manual of Land 
Warfare (hereinafter "Land Warfare"), will be highlighted.65 The British manual also 
makes frequent reference to the French and German manuals concerning land 
warfare.66 
61
 T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, p 342. See also Hall, who notes that there was evidence during World War 1 of the Red 
Cross emblem being misused by the Germans for offensive purposes, seemingly under orders on many occasions. 
Allegations that the wounded were killed, and the Red Cross emblem abused, were also made. W E Hall, op cit supra 
n 19, p 484, citing the Report of the Committee on alleged German outrages, appointed by HBM's government, pp 59, 
61. 
62
 Grischa, op cit supra n 2, pp 321-323. See also ibid, p 215. The ICRC initiated such visits to POWs through the 
distribution of relief, extending them ultimately to other categories of detainees. 
63
 Supra n 30. See also Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 5 n (c). 
64
 Preface, Land Warfare, ibid, p iii. The authors of Land Warfare make frequent reference to Professor Oppenheim's 
International Law Vol 2 (international law during wartime) (1905 and 1906), in which "he conceived of international law 
as the empirically identifiable product of the political will of states rather than as a natural feature of life". Book Review, 
Reisman, "Lassa Oppenheim's Nine Lives" (1994) Yale JIL 255, 264. 
65
 See also supra, nn 23-31, and accompanying text. Holland notes that usage grew out of "sentiments of humanity, as also 
of personal honour, reinforced by considerations of general convenience". Preserved for the most part by military 
tradition, acceptable usage was indicated in these authoritative manuals. T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, pp 290-294. 
66
 However, the authors admit that these manuals were published some time before the Geneva Conference of 1906 and 
the Hague Conference of 1907, reducing their value somewhat as guides for these purposes. Preface, Land Warfare, op 
cil supra n 20, p iii. T E Holland wrote the British manual of 1904. Holland notes mildly that the German manual "did 
not follow the Regulations quite closely". T E Holland, op cil supra n 16, pp 292-293. 
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POWs 
The fact that the treatment of POWs had undergone great changes by the time of 
writing is forcefully made in Land Warfare.61 In particular, it is noted, captured 
soldiers were not deemed to be prisoners of the state until the 17th century. This had 
obvious implications for their treatment, which had progressed from killing and 
enslavement, to imprisonment and demands for ransom.68 Otherwise, Land Warfare 
generally parallels the Hague Regulations, eg, with regard to humane treatment, the 
rules of interrogation, and conditions for the safeguarding of personal belongings.69 
Preliminarily, it is noted that "[i]t is forbidden to kill or wound an enemy who 
having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at 
discretion".70 POWs who attempt to escape, however, may be fired upon.71 In parallel 
with Hague Regulation article 8, unsuccessful escapees are liable only to disciplinary 
punishment, which is defined negatively in Paragraph 76 of the British manual as 
excluding a death sentence. Instead, 
Punishment for attempted escape usually consists in curtailment of the measure of liberty 
usually allowed to prisoners, or even of detention. If escapes are of frequent occurrence it 
is permitted to anticipate further attempts by increasing the measures of security.72 
In addition to being fired upon during an escape attempt or for resisting guard, 
P O W s could be sentenced to death if convicted by a "proper court . . . of an offence 
punishable by death under the civil or military law of the captor".73 This implies that 
convicted spies may also be POWs. While the authors note that 
Paragraph 361: It is of little consequence whether the government imposed by the invader 
is called military or civil government, for in either case it is a government imposed by the 
necessity of war . . . , 
they make the ensuing distinction: 
67
 The relevant British instructions were contained in "General rules for prisoners of war interned in the United Kingdom". 
Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 54 n (d). 
68
 Land Warfare, ibid, paragraph 54. Improvements in the treatment of POWs have been attributed to changes in their 
socio-economic value as a labour reserve for the detaining power. See A Rosas, op cil supra n 20, pp 43-75. Much of 
the credit for specifying and developing the 18th century European laws and customs regarding POWs belongs to the 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1785 between the United States and Prussia, reprinted in C Parry (ed), The 
Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol 49 (Oceana Publications, 1969), and cited by A Rosas, op cit supra n 20, pp 349-352. 
See also G Werner, loc cit supra n 27, pp 16, 94; T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, pp 335 ff. 
69
 Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraphs 66-68, and 69-73, respectively. See also paras 82-91 (conditions of 
internment), paras 92-95 (labour), paras 96-101 (parole), paras 102-109 (bureaux of information), paras 110-111 
(prisoner exchange), para 112, (charitable assistance), para 113 (freedom of religion), para 114 (wills, death certificates, 
burials), paras 115-116 (repatriation). 
70
 Ibid, paragraph 50, and Hague Regulations article 23(c). This prohibition, located in Chapter IV of Land Warfare entitled 
"killing and disabling of enemy combatants", is presumably the first step in the taking of prisoners within the dictates 
both of the laws in force, and "religion, morality, civilisation, and chivalry". Ibid, paragraph 39. 
71
 Ibid, paragraph 74, citing Proceedings of the Hague Conference of 1899, p 144. It is further noted that "a previous 
summons to halt and to surrender should be given if possible". [Emphasis added.] See also the Brussels Project article 
28. 
72
 Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 77. The authors note by way of example that during the Franco-German 
War of 1870-1871, the Prussian government severely curtailed the movement of captured French officers because of an 
alleged frequency of escapes. Ibid, n (f). 
73
 Ibid, paragraph 79. See also the Oxford Manual article 23: "[individuals captured as spies cannot demand to be treated 
as prisoners of war". The Hague Regulations are silent on this point. With regard to Grischa's sentence of death as a 
deserter and presumed spy, it is provided in Land Warfare paragraph 64, as follows: 
Deserters from the enemy should be treated as prisoners of war, unless special circumstances render it desirable to 
liberate them. Deserters and subjects of a belligerent captured in the ranks of the enemy have, as already pointed 
out [in Paragraph 36], no right to claim treatment as prisoners of war, or the benefit of the laws of war. 
Emphasis added. Paragraph 36 describes deserters as "traitors to their country". As they "cannot be regarded as 
enemies in the military sense of the term, [they] cannot claim the privileges of the members of the armed force of the 
enemy". 
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Paragraph 364: . . . the civil and penal laws of the occupied country continue as a rule to 
be valid, the courts which administer them are permitted to sit, and all crimes of the 
inhabitants not of a military nature or not affecting the safety of the army are left to their 
jurisdiction. 
Paragraph 365: The officers, men and followers of the occupying force are not answerable 
to the jurisdiction of these courts; they are dealt with by the military law of their army. 
The relevance of this distinction will be discussed below. 
Spies 
The authors of Land Warfare deal with espionage, and acts of treason which are closely 
allied with espionage, in Chapter 5. They begin by noting that espionage is "formally 
sanctioned by the Hague Rules", and further, that "it is lawful to employ spies and 
secret agents".74 Nevertheless, they emphasise that "custom admits their punishment by 
death".75 
As noted above, Hague Regulations article 29 provides a restrictive, technical 
definition of a spy, which requires the spy to act clandestinely and under false 
pretences.76 The authors of Land Warfare point out, however that 
[A]ny person who makes or endeavours to make unauthorised or secret communications 
to the enemy, or to collect information secretly for him, is ordinarily spoken of as a spy. 
and that the Hague definition "does not cover all such cases".77 They further 
distinguish between spies as so defined, and war treason, which latter characterisation 
is not mentioned in the Hague Rules, but exists in customary international law.78 
They conclude that 
Paragraph 164: An officer or soldier who is discovered in the enemy's line dressed as a 
civilian, or wearing the enemy's uniform, may be presumed from the circumstances to be 
a spy, unless he is able to show that he had no intention of obtaining military information. 
However, the fact that a person is in his own army's military uniform when caught 
is not conclusive.79 Hence, and in accordance with the Hague Regulations concerning 
the subject, it would appear that the crucial requirement for conviction as a spy at a 
Paragraph 169 trial80 is proof of intent to obtain enemy military information. Finally, 
the immunity afforded to a captured enemy spy after a successful espionage operation81 
does not extend to persons guilty of war treason, who may be arrested at any place or 
time.82 
Ibid, paragraphs 155, and 158, respectively. The authors admit that, while this latter point is controversial to many 
writers, "military custom has always sanctioned it". Ibid, paragraph 158 n (c). 
Supra n 46. The Hague Conventions are silent on this point. 
Supra n 44. 
Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 160. 
Ibid, paragraph 167. War treason, as described in paragraph 445, includes acts by private individuals or soldiers in 
disguise which, if done by members of the armed forces, may be perfectly legitimate, for example, damaging the means 
of communication, assisting the escape of enemy prisoners, fouling water supplies. Should an act not amount to 
espionage, belligerents may still impose very severe penalties on the basis of war treason. The German military authorities 
in particular interpreted the concept of war treason harshly. T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, pp 348-349. 
Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 165. The authors give as examples a soldier admitted behind enemy lines 
under Red Cross privileges or a flag of truce who then obtains military information. Ibid, paragraph 165 n (b). 
"As required by Hague Rules, 30. Still less can anyone else be punished without previous trial, which in every case is 
indispensable". Ibid, paragraph 169 n (a), citing the Hague Conference, 1899, p 146. 
Who must be granted POW privileges. Ibid, paragraph 170, and Hague Regulations article 31, text quoted supra. 
Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 171. The authors note, however, that Hague Regulations article 13 does not 
restrict the benefit of immunity from prosecution to spies who are soldiers. Ibid, paragraph 171 n (c). 
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Grischa 
Under military custom and usage as reflected in British, French, and German military 
practice by World War 1, it would appear that Grischa, the unsuccessful P O W escapee, 
would face disciplinary punishment at most on recapture, which could in his case 
involve a more severe restriction on his liberty of movement. Further, while the P O W 
is in principle subject to the laws, regulations and orders of the detaining power, he 
remains under the criminal jurisdiction of his own country. Thus, it is impliedly 
recognised, through the complete immunity granted in law from prosecution by a 
detaining power after a successful escape, that the P O W is expected to continue to act 
in the interests of his country of allegiance.83 By so doing, he has a positive duty to 
make the attempt, in order to rejoin his own forces. 
As regards Bjuscheff the deserter, he would not be entitled to claim P O W treatment, 
as both the status, and the equivalent treatment were lost by the act of desertion. On 
the other hand, Paragraph 64 of Land Warfare exhorts commanders to treat deserters 
as POWs, unless circumstances exist which are more favourable to sending them on 
their way.84 Regarding espionage, usage (which of course has no legal force) also 
implied that proof of an intent to obtain enemy military information clandestinely was 
crucial in a conviction for espionage, which in turn relegates the issue of a disguise to 
a matter of circumstance.85 
Viewed in this way, Schieffenzahn's Order regarding deserters and spies appears to 
be much harsher than either the Hague Rules, or military usage, and the refusal by 
Schieffenzahn to adjust Grischa's identity back from that of Bjuscheff on the bases of 
"military and political interests", "the prestige of our courts", "the interests of military 
discipline", and to prevent "prejudice to the State" fully underscores his further 
opinion that "the legal aspect of the case is of very slight importance".86 In other 
words, an intent to spy was presumed simply by the failure of a deserter to report to 
the military authorities within three days. Thus, no distinction is made between an act 
which is absolutely prohibited, and an act which both the written and unwritten rules 
of the day define as resulting from specific circumstances, and which requires intent. 
While it is of course in the very nature of an absolute prohibition that intent may be 
irrelevant, the knife twists when Schieffenzahn's subsequent refusal to adjust Grischa's 
death sentence as a spy to that of disciplinary sanction is based on the dossier's 
"political nature". 
There would be many presumptions favouring the P O W attempting to escape: (1) 
there was a duty to do so; (2) if unsuccessful, disciplinary sanction alone would result; 
and (3) a complete immunity from prosecution for a successful escape upon subsequent 
recapture by the enemy would be granted. The fact that Grischa wore BjuschefT's 
uniform as a disguise in which to escape would have done nothing to alter this legal 
scenario, particularly after his former camp guards arrived in Mervinsk to identify him. 
83
 A belligerent may however attempt to exert coercive political control over its POWs, particularly when an armed conflict 
has ideological content. A Rosas, op cit supra n 20, pp 430, 434. See infra n 86. 
84
 However, "feigned deserters are apt to be treated as spies". T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, p 347. 
85
 Nevertheless, the necessary mental element may be presumed in the face of a risk known to the accused. Grischa wore 
Bjuscheff's uniform because of the risk of recapture. Thus, rationally, Grischa could have been convicted for spying in 
the uniform of Bjuschoff, but only on proof of an intent to obtain military information. 
86
 Supra n 13. Rosas notes that the growing trend towards "total war" seen in World War I, in addition to the "relatively 
high degree of tension between the main protagonists", meant that efforts to exploit POWs politically led to "differential 
treatment according to national origin". A Rosas, op cit supra n 20, p 75. The only tension readily apparent in Zweig's 
account is of a more personal kind - that between Major-General Schieffenzahn (the son of an Austrian miller and 
persecuted by the "vons" while at military school), who wielded the civil authority, and His Excellenz Otto von Lychow, 
Divisional General in charge of troops in transit, Schieffenzahn's superior, and an old Prussian Junker, friend of the 
Emperor, and "protector of Grischa". See also K Petersen, op cit supra n 8, p 17. 
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T H E DIVISION OF A U T H O R I T Y IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED T E R R I T O R Y 
The Hague Rules 
Zweig locates his plot in the Ob-Ost, which by 1917 chiefly comprised the militarily-
occupied lands of Courland, Lithuania, and Northern Poland. The written and 
unwritten laws which govern the occupation of enemy territory are thus of relevance 
in regard to the civil and military administration in place at the time of Grischa's 
re-arrest and subsequent execution. 
The subject of enemy-occupied territory is dealt with in the Hague Regulations 
articles 42-56. Occupation of enemy territory must first be contrasted with both the act 
of invasion, and the fact of ownership. Invasion, while usually preceding, or coincident 
with occupation, may be more transitory in the event, eg, of a special force completing 
its particular task and moving on. In that event, occupation may be said to be 
merely temporary.87 Similarly, ownership usually occurs through formal annexation 
consequent to final conquest.88 Thus, article 42 of the Hague Regulations provides the 
following definition: 
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been 
established and can be exercised.89 
The military occupier is charged with maintaining public order "while respecting, 
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country".90 This means that the civil 
and penal laws of the occupied country generally speaking continue in force, even 
though the native authority can no longer act within the occupied district. The occupier 
may also, inter alia, collect taxes and other money contributions,91 and use state-owned 
military property.92 
A further reference to the potentially transitory character of belligerent occupation 
is apparent in the Hague Regulations article 45, which enjoins the occupier not "to 
compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power". 
This prohibition reflects the continuation of the duty of allegiance to the legitimate 
ruler. Allegiance however is to be contrasted with the transfer of the duty of obedience 
to the occupier (which the legitimate ruler is now incapable of demanding, anyway). 
The inhabitants of the occupied area are thus allowed to pursue their lives largely 
uninterrupted in exchange for submitting to the effective authority exercised by the 
occupier. 
On the other hand, the liberty of the population may be restricted by the power of 
the occupier to suspend the operation of laws to the extent it considers required for the 
safety and the success of its operations. Thus, the occupier will frequently replace the 
actual civil and judicial administration by its own military jurisdiction. As a corollary 
to this, the occupier may declare certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of 
87
 See Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 343. Cf paragraph 343 n (d) (the rules of occupied territory "should be 
observed as far as possible in territories through which troops are passing"). 
88
 See, eg, T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, p 354. 
89
 Thus, occupation must not only be acquired, but maintained. Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 350. It is thus 
essentially a right of control. 
90
 [Emphasis added.] Hague Regulations article 43. See also Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 364, quoted supra 
in text. 
91
 Hague Regulations articles 48-51, but within strict guidelines. See also Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraphs 
369-372. 
92
 Hague Regulations article 53, once again within strict guidelines. Cf article 52. 
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the country, to be punishable. While the right to do so may be viewed as a function 
of military necessity, and of war itself, a belligerent may also be persuaded to so act 
far in excess of its rights by the effectiveness of intimidation of the inhabitants.94 There 
are, thus, two separate jurisdictions exercised by the occupier: that over the native 
population, and that over the occupying troops. 
Usage 
The authors of Land Warfare deal with the occupation of enemy territory in Chapter 
VIII. While discussing the Hague Regulations throughout, they make a number of 
additional, perhaps explanatory, remarks. First, they note that 
In the interests of the inhabitants it is most desirable, though in strict law not necessary, 
that the invader should take measures to make known by proclamation the fact of the 
establishment of occupation and the area over which it extends. He should at the same 
time summarise the effects which result from the new state of affairs.95 
They caution, however that "the occupant . . . must not treat the country as part of 
his own territory".96 Sovereignty does not pass to the occupant, but is merely 
"temporarily latent",97 nor may the occupier alter "the existing form of government, 
upsetting the constitution and the domestic laws, and ignoring the rights of the 
inhabitants".98 On the other hand, the occupier may suspend "political laws and 
constitutional privileges as a matter of course",99 and thus may restrict and condition 
commercial intercourse, impose censorship, control modes of transportation, and 
restrict freedom of movement.100 While religious, educational and medical establish-
ments must be kept open, this is subject to "refraining from reference to politics", and 
the dictates of military necessity, generally.101 
These many usages reflect the authors' assertion that an occupying authority is "a 
government imposed by the necessity of war".102 As such, the occupier can exert a 
fairly free hand over any direct relations between it and the inhabitants. This fact, as 
reflected in the Hague Rules and usages indicated above, has obvious legal and 
economic consequences. On the other hand, 
In return for this considerate treatment it is the duty of the inhabitants to behave in an 
absolutely peaceful manner, to carry on their ordinary pursuits as far as is possible, to take 
93
 See, eg, W E Hall, op cit supra n 19, pp 558-562. Cf Hague Regulations article 23, supra n 35, and, in particular, article 
23(h); "Appendix: Correspondence with the Foreign Office respecting the Interpretation of article 23(h) of the Hague 
Regulations concerning Land Warfare", L Oppenheim, The League of Nations and lis Problems (Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1919), p 48. 
" C / W E Hall, op cit supra n 19, pp 570-571. He notes that "rights which are founded upon mere force reach their natural 
limit at the point where force ceases to be efficient", and likens abusive control mechanisms to "a system of terrorism, 
. . . because an occupying army does not scruple to threaten and to inflict penalties which no government can impose 
upon its own subjects". Ibid, p 575. 
95
 Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 347. For example, "in 1870, the Germans generally, but not always, 
proclaimed military jurisdiction directly they took possession of a locality by reading or posting a notice . . . which gave 
a list of offences against the troops for which the penalty of death would be inflicted". Ibid, paragraph 347 n (c) (citation 
omitted). See also paragraph 364, quoted supra in text. 
96
 Ibid, paragraph 355. Cf Hague Regulations article 55, which specifies that state property must be administered "in 
accordance with the rules of usufruct". 
97
 Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 353. 
98
 Ibid, paragraph 354. Cf W E Hall , op cit supra n 19, p 557 n " 1 " (a modern example of an assertion of substituted 
sovereignty occurred in Alsace in 1870); T E Holland, op cit supra n 16, p 361 n 29 (German practice 1914-1918). "Rights 
of the inhabitants" presumably includes respect for their lives. See Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 383, and 
Hague Regulations article 46. 
99
 Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 362. 
,0
° Ibid, paragraphs 373-377. 
101
 Ibid, paragraphs 378-380. See the 1864 Geneva Convention articles 3 and 4, and the 1906 Geneva Convention articles 
12 and 15. Cf Hague Regulations article 56. 
102
 See Land Warfare, op cit supra n 20, paragraph 361, quoted supra in text. 
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part in no way in the hostilities, to refrain from every injury to the troops of the occupant, 
and from any act prejudicial to their operations, and to render obedience to the officials 
of the occupant . Any violation of this duty is punishable by the occupant.103 
The authors cross-reference this provision to Paragraph 441, et seq, entitled "The 
Punishment of War Crimes". Acts relevant to the population of occupied territories 
include "war rebellion", "espionage and war treason", and "marauding".104 Paragraph 
450 provides that charges of war crimes can carry the death sentence, and may be dealt 
with under Paragraph 449 either by "military courts or by such courts as the belligerent 
concerned may determine'". The authors note further that "it would not be in the 
interests of humanity" to grant a right to such prisoners to claim release at the end of 
the war, "for otherwise belligerents would be forced to carry out capital punishment 
in many more cases that is now usually necessary".105 
Grischa 
In the discussion which immediately precedes, attention has been paid to the rules and 
theory of belligerent occupation. Its purpose has been to stress that, by the outbreak 
of World War 1, a certain commonality in European standards and rules reflected the 
common interests of the major capitalist states. For example, observance of the rules 
of usufruct, rather than powers of outright disposal, was required regarding the use of 
state property. Money contributions could be levied from the occupied population, but 
where private property was in issue, compensation was required.106 Where the rules 
were broken, or simply ignored, elements of conflict inherent to all competitive social 
relations are in evidence. 
In Grischa it is noted that "it did not occur to anyone that the land would ever be 
evacuated". It was to be instead "a future Prussian province".107 The distribution of 
authority in Ob-Ost was as follows. The office of Major-General Schieffenzahn dealt 
with all local constabulary matters. The Divisional General von Lychow was the 
final authority in all military affairs of the staffs of armies in the field quartered in the 
town, but in them only.108 Although the relations between the garrison and field-army 
were somewhat intertwined regarding Grischa's situation, the power to decide his 
fate was either the Major General's, as control over non-military movements in the 
territory (including those of spies and deserters)109 was considered a constabulary 
matter, or the Divisional Head von Lychow's, Schieffenzahn's senior, who was in 
charge of the court martial of the army headquarters of the area and hence, over 
escaped prisoners. 
With particular regard to the administrative tension occasioned by Grischa's 
detention, noted above, it is of interest that two major subplots play throughout 
Zweig's account: (1) the rise of the industrial, militarised European state,110 and (2) the 
conflict occasioned by the rise of the middle classes in Germany to positions of 
authority.111 A t this point, the statement by Clausewitz that "war is a mere 
103
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continuation of (peace-time) policy by other means" becomes relevant."2 In particular, 
factors such as a fluctuating class structure (occasioned at least in part by alterations 
to and within the societal forces of capitalist production) proved influential when the 
time arrived to adopt a stance of political convenience, not only towards the manner 
of waging a technologically-advanced war, but also, towards Grischa. 
Ultimately, we learn that Grischa's case was not determined by rules concerning 
escaped POWs, spies, or the administration of occupied territory.113 Instead, "the legal 
aspect of the case" was balanced against "the military and political interests involved", 
and found to be "of very slight importance".114 The binding obligations found in the 
Hague Regulations were thus effectively limited by "the compatibility of the latter with 
the state's goals",115 as based on legal theories current in Germany in the period before 
1914. This in turn meant that "the fundamental element of the state was power and 
no law could interfere where clashes of power were at play among states".116 
The opposing schools of state community as represented by the development of 
Hague and Geneva law, and state individuality as interpreted through notions of 
individual state political imperative, met in Mervinsk regarding Grischa's fate. In 
particular, the underlying ideological struggle between Schieffenzahn and von Lychow 
reflected not only an interpersonal tension, but also a tension felt throughout Europe 
at the time between competing schools of social, political and military thought. In turn, 
the more jurisprudential concerns inherent in debates over the relationship between law 
and the state source much of the dialogue. Should conclusions as to the strength of the 
rule of law in the relationship between Germany and the other belligerents (and within 
the occupied territory of Ob-Ost) during World War 1 be viewed in this light, it 
becomes clearer perhaps why Hague law and the developed norms of military usage 
were not persuasive in Grischa's case. In other words, while the fact of Grischa's 
second arrest, and trial before execution, appear to have been in conformity with the 
rules of "civilised" European states, the outcome rested on a known fiction. Grischa 
thus demonstrates the victory of power over the forces of law,117 and Bjuscheff dies a 
second time. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In legal and humanitarian terms, "Grischa had a case". On the other hand, the 
wartime "necessity" reflected in the execution of "Bjuscheff" was symptomatic of a 
deeper jurisprudential struggle - that between the state as creator, or as creature, of 
law. It is now proposed to finalise the conclusions reached thus far. 
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Grischa, the Escaped POW? 
According to Hague Regulations, article 4, Grischa the POW is in the protective 
custody of the enemy state, and "not of the individuals or corps" who capture him. 
Article 9 states Grischa's obligation on capture (and presumably, re-capture) to give his 
correct name and rank. Hague Regulations article 8(1) declares that he is subject to the 
detaining power's laws, regulations, and orders in force, and acts of insubordination 
may be severely punished. However, he has a duty to escape.118 In order not to conflate 
the categories of POW and deserter (who could not claim POW treatment), article 8(2) 
allows disciplinary punishment only for an unsuccessful escape attempt. A successful 
escapee is immune from punishment for the escape, according to article 8(3). 
There is no express provision for the humanitarian treatment of POWs in Geneva 
law during World War 1, other than that given in Hague Regulations article 4: "they 
must be humanely treated". Nevertheless, the International Committee for the Red 
Cross play an active role regarding this specific issue on the conditional authority 
contained in Hague Regulations articles 14 and 15. Despite the fact that the 
1906 Geneva Convention brought voluntary humanitarian assistance under the control 
of the belligerent employing it, visits to POW camps became a means by which ICRC 
delegates could observe the application of the Hague Regulations.119 ICRC delegates 
visit Grischa in his second place of internment prior to his execution, and conclude that 
the prison is humanely run. 
The British Manual of Land Warfare conforms with the Hague position on POW 
escape attempts, adding that "disciplinary" punishment does not include the death 
sentence.120 However, POWs may be fired upon during an escape attempt, and may be 
sentenced to death for "an offence punishable by death under the civil or military law 
of the captor".121 This implies for example that POWs may be convicted of spying. 
Therefore, the maximum sentence available in law and usage for Grischa's failed 
escape attempt is disciplinary punishment. His failure to give his true name and rank 
on re-capture is likely to result only in a curtailment of advantages. 
Bjuscheff, the Spy and Deserter? 
Espionage is regulated by Hague law, and article 29 of the Hague Regulations strictly 
defines a spy as a soldier in disguise who penetrates into the zone of operations of the 
enemy with the intention of obtaining enemy military information for communication. 
Article 31 of the Regulations provides that a successful espionage operation meets with 
the same immunity from punishment as a successful escape attempt. 
The authors of Land Warfare imply that the Hague definition is too restrictive, and 
distinguish between spies as so defined, and war treason. With regard to spying, they 
note that there are occasions when a military spy may be caught wearing his own 
uniform,122 and focus more on the element of intent. Therefore, an alleged spy must 
show that he has no intention of obtaining military information for purposes of 
espionage. As to war treason, the Hague Regulations are silent. Nevertheless, this 
category exists in customary international law. Thus, when an act does not amount to 
espionage, belligerents may still impose very severe penalties on the basis of war 
treason, which offence carries no immunity from punishment.123 
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Deserters are dealt with as follows. Deserters, as traitors to their country, lose any 
right to claim either the status or treatment of P O W s because they can no longer be 
regarded as enemies in the military sense.124 This loss of status implies also that the 
I C R C has no authority to care for them, unless they fall within the categories of sick 
and wounded protected through the Geneva Conventions o f 1864 and 1906. Never-
theless, and according to usage, deserters should be treated as POWs, though one 
commentator remarks that feigned deserters may be treated as spies and shot.125 
Grischa is re-captured after his escape attempt wearing a Russian uniform, though 
not his own, and he gives a false name and rank. Thus, the issue of disguise is relevant. 
On the other hand, he quickly reveals his true identity and status, which are confirmed 
by his former camp guards. The problem then becomes to ascertain whether evidence 
exists to prove he possesses an intent to obtain enemy military information, which 
arguably could conflate his status as an escaping P O W with that of a spy. Evidence of 
an intent to spy during his escape would deprive him potentially of P O W treatment,126 
and opens the door to the death penalty.127 
War Law, or War Politics? 
The basic principles of the laws of armed conflict were formulated primarily during the 
18th and 19th centuries among European states which shared growing levels of 
economic inter-dependence. The monopolisation of the twin forces of production and 
capital implicated concurrent developments in arms technology as well as efforts to 
codify humane measures of restraint in the means and methods of warfare. The written 
and unwritten rules which resulted applied among those "civilised" capitalist states 
which possessed a degree of parity in (industrialised) armaments.128 
By implication, Bentham's project of an international code took capitalist 
technology into account. Bentham proposed that each state should restrain its choice 
of the means and methods of warfare, albeit within confines of "the regard which is 
proper to its own well-being".129 The implication thus is that reciprocity in restraint 
is to the ultimate benefit of industrialised states. It is therefore not entirely surprising 
that the more long-term interests of state survival among industrialised states 
should be reflected in the Hague and Geneva instruments. However, by the end of 
the 19th century, neo-Hegelian views current in Germany undermined the consensus 
regarding treaty obligation. The thesis that international restrictions such as those 
applicable during war could not plausibly be characterised as law, in conjunction with 
a superficial reading of the Clausewitzian view of war as an extension of (peace-time) 
policy,130 meant that any analogy between the obligations inherent in municipal 
law contracts and international treaties was theoretically unsupportable.131 The 
resulting dialectical theory of war escalation thus rested on the view that, as the state 
stood above its treaties, it did "not need to seek objective standards of behaviour"132 
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outside itself. The effect of this was to make the obligations contained in Hague law 
and military usage a matter of self-regulation, and hence, of political self-interest.133 
Grischa? Bjuscheff? 
When it is put to Schieffenzahn that "the matter had gone far beyond a mere question 
of jurisdiction", as an innocent man was being sent to his death, Schieffenzahn 
characterises Grischa/Bjuscheff as "a Russian deserter, who had so disgracefully 
abandoned his post in the prison camp", and adds, " i f the German soldier refuses to 
obey orders, he is shot".134 
According to the logic of the executioner, there is no need to treat Grischa as an 
enemy in the military sense, i f one assumes that desertion is roughly equivalent to 
"abandonment". As deserters cannot claim either the status or treatment of P O W s , 
there is no need-legal or otherwise-to consider Hague definitions of espionage.135 
Schieffenzahn thus assimilates Grischa's status as an escaped P O W with that of a 
deserter, a point which Hague Regulation article 8 was intended to avert.136 T o 
connate Grischa's status and behaviour with that of a German soldier is somewhat 
disingenuous, however. In common with the German soldier, Grischa the P O W shares 
a duty of obedience to Germany, which in Grischa's case is transitory. On the other 
hand, Grischa owes a continuing duty of allegiance to Russia which implicates the duty 
to escape.137 
Further, the Order under which Grischa/Bjuscheff is convicted and executed for 
espionage consists of an absolute prohibition applicable specifically to "Russian 
deserters".138 As Russia was removing itself from the "common European heritage",139 
the potential spread of a spirit of revolt into the rest of Europe caused great alarm.140 
When coupled with the dictates of occupational security in Ob-Ost, there was thus 
perhaps even less reason of a "political" nature to adhere to Hague obligations - self-
regulatory or otherwise. 
As discussed earlier, the maintenance of control over occupied territory must be 
effective,141 and it is not at all uncommon for the inhabitants o f enemy-occupied 
territory to suffer various forms of intimidation, the force behind which serves also to 
keep the occupying army disciplined. It must thus be queried whether the "political 
necessity" of executing Grischa was sourced ultimately in these manifold "interests of 
discipline".142 Nevertheless, it was difficult to find among those stationed in the 
garrison a company willing to shoot Grischa. Instead, a Bavarian machine-gun 
battalion, sent back from the front for delousing and re-equipping prior to transport 
to the Flanders fighting, agree to execute Bjuscheff in exchange for four bottles of 
schnapps. Its men have an average age of 20 years.143 
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